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DUAL CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DUELS:
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND STATE IMPLEMENTATION




Frequently, state-wide executive agencies and localities
attempt to implement federally inspired programs. Two
predominant examples are cooperative federalism programs
and incorporation of federal standards in state-specific law.
Federally inspired programs can bump into state constitutional
restrictions on the allocation of powers, especially in states
whose constitutional systems embrace stronger prohibitions on
legislative delegation than the weak restrictions at the federal
level, where national goals and standards are made.
This Article addresses this tension between dual federal/state
normative accounts of the constitutional allocation of powers in
state implementation of federally inspired programs. To the
extent the predominant ways of resolving the tension come from
federal courts, state constitutionalism is challenged to produce
its own account of its relevance in an era of federal programs.
After surveying and critiquing the interpretative practices of
state courts in dealing with these conflicting constitutional
norms, the Article presents an institutional design account of
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state allocation ofpowers, which might better explain why states
routinely suspend constitutional restrictions on delegation in the
context of state implementation of federally inspired programs.
The Article questions whether constitutional restrictions on
legislative delegation have any normative basis in the context of
state implementation of federally inspired programs, but also
argues that it is important for state courts to answer this
question as a matter of state constitutional interpretation-and
not by ceding turf to federal courts under the Supremacy Clause
or other federally imposed judicial interpretations.
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With the post-New Deal growth of federal power, states are
increasingly called on to implement federal programs. In a variety
of regulatory contexts-ranging from health, safety and environ-
mental regulation to network infrastructure and transporta-
tion-Congress and federal regulators routinely look to state and
local governments to implement federal programs and regulatory
goals. Often the federal government offers a "carrot" for state or
local compliance, providing funding for programs such as welfare,
Medicaid, or public school standards and testing. States frequently
take the silver, voluntarily acquiescing to federal programs or
regulatory standards that bump up against state constitutional
restrictions.1
Even outside of the context in which a state stands to benefit
financially from adopting a federal program or standard-for
example, where some state or local official voluntarily endorses
it-state constitutions frequently present barriers to the implemen-
tation of federal goals or the adoption of federal standards. State
decisions to participate in a federal program or to adopt a federal
standard may involve constitutional rights,s but sometimes they will
conflict directly with the allocation of powers between the branches
or levels of government articulated in a state constitution as well.
The prototypical scenario discussed in this Article is common under
federal and state statutes. Often states are asked to adopt programs
that rely on, implement, or incorporate federal statutes and
regulations; frequently they choose to adopt these programs. For
example, a state legislature's statute regulating water pollutants
might rely on definitions or standards adopted by the U.S. Environ-
1. Focusing on states trading state constitutional protections for federal revenues,
William Van Alstyne has argued that state and local governments may not accept federal
funds where doing so puts at risk rights that state constitutional law protects. William Van
Alstyne, "Thirty Pieces of Silver"for the Rights of Your People: Irresistible Offers Reconsidered
as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 303, 307 (1993).
2. For example, the Portland, Oregon police department refused to cooperate with the
FBI's attempt to interview approximately 5,000 men of Middle Eastern descent, claiming that
the FBI's program resulted in a type of racial profiling prohibited by Oregon law. Fox
Butterfield, A Police Force Rebuffs F.B.I. on Querying Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2001, at B7. This Article focuses on separation of powers issues, so discussion of state
constitutional rights provisions that are more restrictive than the U.S. Constitution's
protections is beyond its scope.
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mental Protection Agency (EPA), or may even explicitly incorporate
EPA regulations or guidance documents into state law.
Dual constitutions-federal and state-produce the prospect of
dueling substantive and procedural constitutional norms between
the federal and state levels of government. Cooperative federalism
programs, in which the federal government relies on states or
localities to adopt and/or to implement a federal goal, might run into
barriers under state constitutions. Apart from cooperative
federalism-in which Congress defines a regulatory end-state
programs pursuing a variety of different goals may adopt federal
standards in the interest of promoting uniformity and/or efficiency.
The adoption of such standards presents a potential conflict with
state constitutions. To the extent such state implementation of
federally inspired programs complies with the processes specified
under state constitutions, conflicts between state and federal law
are rare. Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,'
federal substantive law often preempts contrary state substantive
law. Even when there is no preemption issue, if a state has volun-
tarily adopted substantive federal legal standards pursuant to all
applicable state constitutional and procedural law, no conflict
between the state and federal constitutions arises.
At some level, however, state constitutions do present a direct
legal conflict for state adoption of, implementation of, or acquies-
cence to, federal regulatory standards and goals. In the context of
such regulatory programs, constitutional duels are most likely to
arise where federal substantive standards bump up against
procedural restrictions in state constitutions, such as a state
constitution's allocation of power between intrastate branches of
government. For instance, there may be a deficit in legislative
authorization to implement federal law where a state agency lacks
the appropriate legislative delegation, pursuant to its state
constitution, to adopt or act in accordance with a federal statute or
regulation. To be sure, conflicts can be even more direct. A state
legislature may oppose the adoption or implementation of federal
law by officials in a state executive branch. This not only presents
a tension between the legislative and executive branches of a state
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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system of government, but it can also place a state legislature in
direct confrontation with a federal statute or regulatory program.4
For example, by instituting a state implementation plan pursuant
to the Clean Air Act, a state legislature may give a regulatory
agency express authority to adopt regulations that rely on defini-
tional terms or incorporate standards in the EPA guidelines.
Although such a delegation is seemingly innocuous,' it poses a
problem under a state's constitution to the extent that the state
adopts a more stringent separation of powers doctrine-the
nondelegation doctrine in particular-than exists at the federal
level.'
The relevance of state constitutional restrictions on delegation in
an era of federal programs is hardly settled. Certainly, under the
Supremacy Clause, the federal government has the power to
override state constitutional requirements-at least structural
requirements, which are purely state law-when it speaks unequiv-
ocally in establishing a federal program. The threshold for preemp-
tion of state programs is hardly settled, though, in part because of
the difficult institutional issues that often arise in the implementa-
tion of state programs. Cooperative federalism programs, such as
those under environmental statutes and in the telecommunications
context that are touted for valuing state-centered solutions to
regulatory programs,7 present a particularly difficult challenge for
state constitutions, which frequently delimit a narrow scope of
authority for state and local agencies. Although a federal program
4. Many of these potential obstacles with state executive branches can apply to
municipal governments as well. To the extent a municipal government derives authority from
the state legislature, it may not have the authority to implement federal programs, or a state
legislature can affirmatively stand in the way of a municipal government's efforts to
implement a federal program.
5. For example, a state legislature may be attempting to save administrative costs by
borrowing a standard from a well-informed and recognized regulatory authority.
6. For a discussion of state separation of powers doctrine, and nondelegation in
particular, see Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (1999); see also Harold H.
Bruff, Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1337 (1990); John
Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and
Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205 (1993).
7. For a discussion of the state-centered solutions of the Telecommunications Act, see
Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the
Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1738 (2001).
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may impliedly or expressly allow these agencies to act,8 a state
legislature might refuse to acquiesce to federal goals and thereby
present a potential conflict between federal and state legislative
power.
There are several ways that federal courts might resolve this
conflict in our dual federal/state constitutional scheme. One
approach is for a court to rely on express or implied preemption
analysis to find that Congress not only allowed state regulation, but
effectively authorized state agencies to regulate an activity where
a state legislature has failed to do so, even though regulation would
otherwise violate the state's constitution.9 Such a finding would
allow the federal program to preempt state separation of powers
jurisprudence. Even without endorsing broad federal preemption of
state law, one author has drawn on political process principles to
argue for a normative clear statement rule that might have
implications in this context: state and local agencies might be
presumptively authorized to act absent a clear statement by the
state legislature to the contrary. 10
Although resorting to federal law has its appeal as a solution to
these conflicts, this Article looks to state constitutions to question
whether U.S. constitutional standards, such as the Supremacy
Clause,11 or externally imposed, federally inspired clear statement
rules are necessary. This Article argues that state courts have a way
of resolving such conflicts on their own terms as a matter of state
constitutional law. I concur with the general outcome of allowing
state agencies to implement cooperative federalism programs and
other state-adopted federal standards. Instead of rooting federally
8. Not everyone is sanguine about the constitutional status of such arrangements under
federal law. For an argument that cooperative federalism programs that rely on state
implementation violate federal nondelegation principles, see Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative
Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 270-
80(1997).
9. See Wash. Dep't of Game v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 207 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1953).
10. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and
Local Officials from State Legislatures'Control, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1201 (1999). The legal source
of this normative presumption is unclear. In federal courts, the presumption might be based
on implied preemption of state constitutions to the extent that Congress has adopted a
cooperative federalism program envisioning an active state role in its implementation. In
state courts, such a presumption could be the best reading of a state constitution's separation
of powers.
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
1348 [Vol. 46:1343
20051 DUAL CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DUELS
inspired regulatory programs in federal preemption doctrine or a
clear statement rule constructed by federal judges, however, this
Article proposes that state constitutions, properly interpreted by
state courts, allow and authorize state implementation of federal
programs and standards by executive branch agencies. In other
words, the best normative interpretation of state separation of
powers does not require state courts to cede their turf to federal
courts in order to sustain cooperative federalism programs or to
implement or adopt federal substantive law. State constitutions are
not rendered moot by virtue of the existence of a federal program,
including one that purports to authorize state agencies to act or one
that provides substance for the regulatory approach adopted by
state agencies. Rather than inviting broad preemption by allowing
even vague federal statutes and regulations to preempt state
constitutions, state courts can make state constitutions more
relevant to the resolution of state/federal conflicts if they take an
institutionalist strategy in interpreting separation of powers in the
context of federalism programs.
Part I illustrates how cooperative federalism programs present
particularly salient conflicts between state legislatures and federal
goals, and discusses the two predominant solutions to these conflicts
in the literature. Part II discusses the descriptive approaches state
courts have adopted to deal with the problem of unconstitutional
delegations by state legislatures against the backdrop of federal
programs, and concludes that these strategies are unsatisfying, if
not disingenuous. Part III suggests that a separation of powers
jurisprudence that positions itself to address the specific institu-
tional decision-making processes of state governments, rather than
a jurisprudence featuring Lockean absolutist rules defining spheres
of sovereignty, provides the most promising interpretive alternative
for state courts in addressing the type of separation of powers
problems presented in Parts I and II. An institutional approach to
understanding the interpretation of state constitutions in an era of
national programs positions a state constitution within a dual
federal/state system without making it an obstacle to a federal
program or allowing federal courts impliedly to preempt it.
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I. DUELS BETWEEN FEDERAL REGULATORY GOALS AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS IN COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM PROGRAMS
In the past three decades, a novel approach to federalism issues
has emerged as an alternative to the traditional view that federal
and state governments occupy distinctive spheres of legal authority.
In contrast to the traditional flavor of federalism, which relegates
state and federal authorities to independent jurisdictional spheres,
cooperative federalism envisions overlap between federal and state
regulators as a positive. Generally, cooperative federalism has been
defined as follows:
Cooperative federalism programs set forth some uniform federal
standards-as embodied in the statute, federal agency regula-
tions, or both-but leave state agencies with discretion to
implement the federal law, supplement it with more stringent
standards, and, in some cases, receive an exemption from federal
requirements. This power allows states to experiment with
different approaches and tailor federal law to local conditions.12
Such an approach recognizes that state and federal regulators do
not operate in hermetically sealed jurisdictional spheres; rather, the
overlap in their authority is "messy and chaotic."13 Federal and state
regulators often must work together to implement their regulatory
goals."4
Moreover, the cooperative federalism model sees jurisdictional
overlap as beneficial. It concedes a need for federal regulation, and
the ideal of uniformity in general goals, but also recognizes the
positive contribution states can make to the regulatory process. For
example, given the reduced cost of political mobilization at the state
and local levels, involving states in the regulatory process may
increase participation, which can have obvious payoffs for regula-
12. Weiser, supra note 7, at 1696 (footnotes and citations omitted).
13. Id. at 1693.
14. Jim Chen identifies cooperative federalism in telecommunications regulation as the
"Colorado school," given that some of its key proponents, such as Philip Weiser, Judge
Stephen Williams of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and Dale Hatfield, have strong
connections with or live in that state. Jim Chen, Subsidized Rural Telephony and the Public
Interest: A Case Study in Cooperative Federalism and Its Pitfalls, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 307, 313 (2003).
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tory compliance, legitimacy, and efficiency. States are also more
likely to experiment in a regulatory approach, trying out mecha-
nisms that would not likely be adopted without experience by
Congress or federal regulators. State enforcement and state-adopted
programs encourage experimentation with different approaches and
allow federal goals to be tailored to local conditions. 5
Cooperative federalism exists under several federal statutes. For
example, it was endorsed in the major environmental law statutes
passed in the 1970s. Congress set forth minimum standards for
environmental issues such as water pollution, but left states
considerable discretion to implement the federal law. Under
"savings clauses," for example, states are often allowed the flexibil-
ity to adopt more stringent environmental standards.16 As the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals describes the role of the states
under this approach:
By the contemplation of minimum federal standards, however,
Congress did not intend to relegate the States to the status of
enforcement agents for the executive branch of the federal
government. To the contrary, it is indisputable that Congress
specifically declined to attempt a preemption of the field in the
area of water pollution legislation, and as much as invited the
States to enact requirements more stringent than the federal
standards. 1
7
In some cases, state agencies implement their own programs that
exempt them from federal requirements."
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act) also adopts a
cooperative federalism solution, replacing the dual federalism
model of the 1934 Telecommunications Act with a more coordinated
15. Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism,
79 N.C. L. REv. 663, 671 (2001).
16. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2000); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (2000).
17. Mianus River Pres. Comm. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 899, 906 (2d Cir. 1976).
18. See David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a "Reinvented"
State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
1, 35 (2000); see also Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1141 (1995) (exploring how "responsibilities for
environmental protection policy have been, and should be, allocated between federal, state,
and local governments").
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regulatory regime. With the 1996 Act-the first major overhaul of
federal communications statutes in more than sixty years-
Congress established a "pro-competitive, de-regulatory national
policy framework" for the telecommunications industry.19 Under the
1996 Act, incumbent providers of local telephone service are
required to negotiate in good faith with new entrants to agree on the
terms and conditions for any interconnection service between
them,2° submitting interconnection agreements to the relevant state
public utilities commission (PUC) for approval.2 Where the
incumbent and new entrant cannot reach agreement, a party may
petition the state PUC to arbitrate any dispute and,22 if the state
PUC declines to arbitrate the dispute, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) steps in to resolve the dispute.2 If a party
believes that the arbitrated settlement does not comport with the
1996 Act, a federal district court is empowered to consider appeals,
even if they are arbitrated by a state PUC.24 This is a significant
departure from the traditional process-long accepted in telecom-
munications and energy regulation--of appealing state PUC orders
to state courts.25
One novel-and perhaps the most fundamental-question about
such programs is how courts should resolve conflicts between
federal regulatory programs and recalcitrant state legislatures
which, through inaction, stand as a barrier to their implementation.
For instance, if a state legislature explicitly refuses to authorize its
state regulatory agency to embrace a competitive approach to local
19. S. CONF. REP. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996).
20. Id. §§ 251(c)(1), 252(a)(1) (2000).
21. Id. § 252(e)(1).
22. Id. § 252(b).
23. Id. § 252(e)(5).
24. Id. § 252(e)(6).
25. As the Supreme Court has observed:
[The 1996 Act] broadly extended [federal] law into the field of intrastate
telecommunications, but in a few specified areas (ratemaking, interconnection
agreements, etc.) has left the policy implications of that extension to be
determined by state commissions, which-within the broad range of lawful
policymaking left open to administrative agencies-are beyond federal control.
Such a scheme is decidedly novel, and the attendant legal questions, such as
whether federal courts must defer to state agency interpretations of federal law,
are novel as well.
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 385 n.10 (1999).
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telephony, federal and state regulators may find themselves at odds.
The only way state regulators can break the impasse is by ignoring
state law, including the constitutional allocation of powers delimited
in a state constitution. Commentators have proposed two main
solutions to this question.
The first solution relies on the Supremacy Clause, which allows
Congress and federal agencies to preempt "[1]aws of any State" that
contravene a federal law or regulation.26 That Congress and federal
agencies have the power to override state executive decisions has
long been recognized by federal courts. For instance, in State of
Washington Department of Game v. Federal Power Commission,"
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit required the State
of Washington to accept a hydroelectric license for the City of
Tacoma over the objections of the Washington State Attorney
General, who opposed the project.2" Even though the City of Tacoma
had not obtained a permit from the Washington State Supervisor of
Hydraulics, as was required under a statute passed by the Washing-
ton legislature, the court held that "[t]he Federal Government's
power over navigable waters is superior to that of the state."29
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in First Iowa Hydro-
Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission,'0 the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that any other result would give a state veto power
over a federal hydroelectric project, destroying the effectiveness of
the hydroelectric licensing scheme laid out in the Federal Power
Act.3'
On the federal preemption view, a federal assertion of power is
justified under obstacle preemption analysis pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause, however crude Congress's delegation to the
federal agency or the federal regulatory action. The federal regula-
tory action is able to achieve supremacy status notwithstanding the
26. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
27. 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953).
28. Id. at 392-93, 398.
29. Id. at 396 (citing McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876)).
30. 328 U.S. 152, 164 (1946) (holding that if section 9(b) of the Federal Power Act was
construed to require compliance with state laws in every instance, it would make every
application to the Federal Power Commission subject to state control in direct contradiction
to the congressional mandate that the project be subject to "the judgment of the ...
Commission"); see also 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (section 9(b) of the Federal Power Act).
31. Wash. Dep't of Game, 207 F.2d at 396.
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contrary wishes of a state legislature or a state executive. Further,
the federal assertion of power prevails over, or preempts, any
allocation of power among the branches and between state and local
governments laid out in a state constitution.
In the face of extensive federal regulation, overlapping state
regulatory requirements that conflict have been held to violate
the Supremacy Clause. In his dissent to First Iowa, Justice Felix
Frankfurter argued that applicants for Federal Power Commission
licenses should be required to follow state procedural requirements,
even though this might delay approval of a project, because the
measure of "justice" is "deliberate speed." 2 The Court, however,
appears to have rejected Frankfurter's view. The federal preemption
approach to validating cooperative federalism programs is only
effective if courts are extremely broad in finding state preemption
of such programs, elevating regulatory expediency over state
constitutional procedural requirements in this context.
The continued vitality of the preemption approach to validating
state and local agency implementation of cooperative federalism
goals may be questioned in light of recent Supreme Court cases that
limit federal power. New York v. United States"3 and Printz v.
United States34 both struck down federal laws that imposed duties
on nonfederal officials. As Roderick Hills observes, however, the
Court's anti-commandeering decisions are not necessarily fatal to
the federal preemption approach to upholding the implementation
of cooperative federalism programs by states:
[F]ederal law does not require anyone to do anything when it
preempts state laws that limit the powers of state or local
officials. At most, such federal laws simply require the state to
remove certain restrictions on the power of subordinate officials
so that those officials can voluntarily assume federal duties."
32. 328 U.S. at 188 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
33. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding the "take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985 unconstitutional).
34. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding state enforcement of the Brady Act unconstitutional).
35. Hills, supra note 10, at 1211.
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So long as some state or local official voluntarily attempts to assume
federal duties, Congress has not forced state or local action, and no
commandeering threat is present.
A second approach does not imply preemption broadly but uses
judicially created clear statement rules to harness state political
processes to favor cooperative federalism approaches--or at least to
make their rejection by recalcitrant state legislatures more affirma-
tive and explicit.36 In one of the leading articles on the architecture
of cooperative federalism programs, Roderick Hills argues that
federal authorities have the power to "delegate" federal powers to
specific state and local institutions even when the state legislature
has failed to make such a delegation.37 Hills rejects as unpersuasive
the absolutist "state supremacy" position as a barrier to the exercise
of federal power through state institutions.' Instead, drawing on
political process concerns, he embraces a general presumption in
favor of delegating power to nonfederal governmental institutions
for the purpose of promoting local self-governance. 39 His ap-
proach-a presumption in favor of the exercise of local power absent
state legislative authorization to the contrary-is also compatible
with allowing cooperative federalism programs some operation
within a state.
Both the federal preemption approach and a judicially con-
structed presumption in favor of local authority allow state and local
agency implementation of cooperative federalism programs to
survive, even against the backdrop of contrary state laws including
state constitutions which may prove limiting to local power or
legislative delegations to executive agencies. Yet both approaches
leave little role for state constitutions in a cooperative federalism
environment. Under the preemption view, federal law crudely
overrides state constitutions, even where federal law is vague.
Under the state autonomy view, courts are to construct a presump-
tion that favors local power over centralized state legislative
36. The legal source of such clear statement rules is not entirely clear. See supra note 10
and accompanying text.
37. Hills, supr note 10, at 1276-80. Hills includes in his analysis not only the scenario
in which a state has refused to authorize a state agency to implement federal law, but also
the scenario in which a state legislature has prohibited a state agency from acting in
accordance with federal law.
38. Id. at 1215-16.
39. Id. at 1222-23.
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authority, notwithstanding state constitutional law to the contrary.
In both cases, therefore, state constitutional law is effectively
overridden as a matter of federal law.In this sense both approaches pose a substantial threat to state
constitutions as an independent set of legal norms regarding the
allocation of powers. Perhaps the laudable ends of federal programs
justify the means of overriding state constitutions in the context of
cooperative federalism programs. There is, however, an odd irony to
these methods of sustaining cooperative federalism goals. Both
methods rely on constitutional norms imposed on states from the
"outside," not on legal norms that are recognized as legitimate
within a state's own constitutional system of government. For any
approach to regulation that purports to value local participation
and political processes-as cooperative federalism does-bluntly
overriding the primary source of legal legitimacy for the state's
system of government is a high cost to pay.
II. INTERPRETIVE EFFORTS TO RETAIN THE RELEVANCE OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS
Despite efforts to find solutions to potential conflicts from outside
of the state, state courts have developed their own methods for
approaching federal programs from the inside, such as interpreting
federal mandates in light of state constitutional requirements.
Frequently embraced as a source of legitimacy for localized solutions
to regulatory programs, state constitutions are desirable frame-
work mechanisms for governance in three main respects. First,
state political processes-governed primarily by state constitu-
tions-are more likely to allow regulatory law solutions to adapt to
local circumstances and needs.4° Second, state political processes, as
spelled out in state constitutions, are more likely to provide for
adaptation and experimentation rather than a one-size-fits-all
approach to regulatory problems at the national level.41 Third, to the
40. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third. Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1988). For criticism of this advantage of state,
as opposed to local governance, see Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism " Normative and
Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (1994).
41. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
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extent that state political processes are more easily accessible to
interest groups than the national political process, a state constitu-
tion is a framework for political legitimacy that might hold promise
over the national Constitution for formulating legitimate political
solutions. At a minimum, state political processes will provide
jurisdictional competition with the federal government, but the
legitimacy benefits of state governance might also be great.4 2 State
constitutions are more likely to reflect the unique institutional
issues affecting state and local governments, and thus yield
legitimate solutions to regulatory problems, particularly when
compared to a single, one-size-fits-all solution forced onto a state
from outside the structure of state government.43
With these benefits to state-based political processes in mind,
many commentators embrace what has come to be known as
"independent state constitutionalism" as a way for state courts (and
federal courts borrowing from or applying state law) to stay true to
the origins, purposes, and structure of a unique constitutional
document.44 Independent state constitutionalism is a challenge,
as fifty state judicial systems attempt to parse meaning from
fifty different constitutional texts. However, an independent state
constitutionalism may allow articulation of a set of trans-state
constitutional norms independent of the Federal Constitution.45 It
is important, though, to recognize what an independent state
constitutionalism does and does not require. As an interpretive task,
independent constitutionalism requires state courts to make sense
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288 (1998).
42. See Merritt, supra note 40, at 7-9.
43. See Hon. James D. Heiple & Kraig James Powell, Presumed Innocent: The Legitimacy
of Independent State Constitutional Interpretation, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1507, 1510-11 (1998);
Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271, 292-
93 (1998); Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and
Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 46-47
(1989); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of
Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 356-57 (1984).
44. Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 97 (2000); Jennifer Friesen, State Courts as Sources
of Constitutional Law: How to Become Independently Wealthy, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1065,
1077-79 (1997); Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution
Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 439-41 (1996); Williams, supra note 43, at 356-57.
45. Rodriguez, supra note 43, at 290-91.
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of a state constitution on its own terms. Independent consti-
tutionalism does not, however, commit every state to a view of
independent constitutional power.46 State power, in other words,
does not exist solely to serve the state polity; it also exists to protect
individuals from tyrannical acts on the part of both state and
national governments. In addition, it may also serve as a type of
"cog" in the machine of a broader, more national political process.47
Yet efforts to legitimize cooperative federalism by crude judicial
appeals to federal preemption doctrine or clear statement rules
render state constitutions moot as a legal matter, leaving little role
for the understanding of state constitutions as normative mecha-
nisms of interpretation and governance. Cooperative federalism
programs are often approached as federal delegations to state
agencies, but similar issues arise where a state legislature delegates
to federal agencies through incorporation by reference to federal
regulatory standards. In contrast to the efforts to legitimize federal
46. Indeed, it is unclear whether states were even independent legal authorities at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution. Akhil Amar adheres to the traditional view of the
"legally independent status of the states prior to adoption of the Constitution...." Akhil Reed
Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 457, 469 n.37 (1994) (noting that the Declaration of Independence referred to "free and
independent States," the Articles of Confederation expressly recognized the "sovereignty" of
the states, and the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain recognized the legal independence of
individual states). Other scholars, however, suggest that although the colonies may have been
legally separate and independent of each other, they were not entirely sovereign states even
after independence from Great Britain was declared. Instead, they became a part of a
continental American political community. PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775-1787, at 22 (1983)
(noting that throughout the revolutionary period "the identification of the American states
with the common cause [against the British] and membership in [the Continental] Congress
worked directly against notions of truly independent statehood"); see also SAMUEL H. BEER,
To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 200-06 (1993) (arguing that
the Declaration of Independence from Great Britain was not an act of independent
sovereignty on the part of the colonies but was authorized by the Articles of Confederation).
47. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National
Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1005 (2003)
[hereinafter Gardner, State Constitutional Rights]; see also James A. Gardner, What is a State
Constitution?, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1025, 1044-54 (1993) (arguing that state constitutions are not
the embodiment of independent political values, but instead are safeguards that reinforce
national political values that the federal government has failed to protect); Paul W. Kahn,
Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1166-67
(1993) (noting that state courts need not rely on "unique state sources" to support
interpretation but should attempt "to realize for their own communities the ideals that are
the common heritage of the nation").
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programs by appeals to federal preemption or clear statement
rules-in the context of state legislative delegation to adopt federal
regulatory standards by reference-many state courts continue to
embrace an independent state constitutionalism. For these courts,
state constitutions retain their legal status, but state adoption of
federal standards gives rise to special approaches to interpreting
state constitution nondelegation restrictions.
A. State Separation of Powers Limits on Legislative Delegations
Judicial opinions by state supreme and appellate courts seem to
recognize that, while an independent interpretive method is
important, state power does not exist in complete isolation from the
federal system. Scholars have suggested that state constitutional
rights are not entirely independent of the U.S. Constitution's rights
protections.4" The same may also be said of structural provisions of
state constitutions, such as separation of powers. In particular,
state appellate court applications of the nondelegation doctrine in
the context of state implementation of federal law are telling. More
than their federal counterparts-which embrace a relaxed non-
delegation doctrine 49 -the separation of powers doctrine as applied
to legislative delegations by many state courts is much more rigid.'
Florida courts, for example, endorse a strong nondelegation
doctrine in interpreting Florida's Constitution, sharply limiting the
power of Florida's legislature to pass laws that give other branches
of government, particularly the executive branch, the power to make
fundamental policy choices about the regulations they adopt.
According to the text of Florida's Constitution: "The powers of the
state government shall be divided into legislative, executive, and
judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise
any [of the] powers appertaining to either of the other branches
unless expressly provided herein."'" Florida courts claim that this
48. See Gardner, State Constitutional Rights, supra note 47, at 1005.
49. In the federal system, the predominant model for reviewing delegations is often
attributed to Kenneth Culp Davis, who suggested that courts uphold delegations to executive
branch agencies so long as procedural safeguards, including judicial review of an agency's
decisions, remain in place. Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 713, 725 (1969).
50. See Rossi, supra note 6, at 1228-29.
51. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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text prohibits the state legislature from delegating legislative
authority to an executive branch agency absent specific standards
and guidelines that constrain the agency. In Askew v. Cross Key
Waterways,5" the Florida Supreme Court held unconstitutional an
environmental statute that delegated to an agency the authority
to designate geographic areas of critical state concern (subject to
additional planning requirements) and, in certain instances, to
adopt land use regulations. 3 The statute passed by Florida's
legislature contained several explicit limits on agency designation
of areas,5 but despite these limits on agency discretion in the
statute, the Florida Supreme Court held the statute to be unconsti-
tutional on nondelegation grounds. Acknowledging the inevitable
need for an agency to "flesh out" policy, the court distinguished this
from "making the initial determination of what policy should be."'
Relying on a somewhat formalistic interpretation of Florida's strict
separation of powers clause, the Supreme Court rejected Kenneth
Culp Davis's procedural safeguards approach, holding instead that
the Florida legislature must provide specific standards or guidelines
to both aid and constrain the agency in exercising its discretion.'
The presence. of such standards or guidelines aids judicial review
by giving courts specific criteria to apply when reviewing agency
action.57 Since Askew was decided in the 1970s, the Florida Supreme
Court has had several occasions to revisit the doctrine and has
consistently reaffirmed the constitutional need for specific stan-
dards and guidelines in legislation to validate a delegation of
legislative authority to an agency. 58
52. 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1979).
53. Id. at 925.
54. The "critical state concern" designation was only allowed if: (1) the area contained or
had a significant impact upon "environmental, historical, natural, or archeological resources
of regional or statewide importance;" (2) the area was "significantly affected by, or [had] a
significant effect upon, an existing or proposed major public facility or other area of major
public investment;" or (3) the area had major development potential, such as the proposed site
of a new community. Id. at 914 (describing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.05(2) (West 1975) (amended
1997 and 1998) (defining areas that may be designated areas of critical concern)).
55. Id. at 920.
56. Id. at 925.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 993-94 (Fla. 1994) (holding a juvenile escape
statute invalid because it did not contain specific criteria or standards for the agency to
apply); Chiles v. Children, 589 So. 2d 260, 266-67 (Fla. 1991) (holding that a statute
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A recent Texas Supreme Court case, Texas Boll Weevil
Eradication Foundation, Inc. v. Lewellen (Boll Weevil), echoes this
approach, although in a slightly different delegation context.59 A
Texas statute authorized the state's Commissioner of Agriculture
to recognize a private foundation that was authorized to propose
geographic boll weevil eradication zones.' If an official zone was
established, the foundation proposed assessments for cotton
growers to pay subject to the growers' approval in a subsequent
referendum.6' In addition, the foundation was extended broad
powers to impose penalties for late payment of assessments and to
recommend to the Department of Agriculture that nonpaying
growers' crops be destroyed. 2 However, apart from a referendum
and a requirement that the Commissioner of Agriculture certify the
private organization petitioning to become the foundation, the
statute contained few checks on the foundation's powers.' The
Texas Supreme Court invalidated the delegation to the foundation
as a violation of the separation of powers clause of the Texas
Constitution, observing that "[s]tate courts may have less need to
reinvigorate the doctrine, since they have historically been more
comfortable with striking down state laws on this basis than their
federal counterparts."' While Boll Weevil addresses a legislative
delegation to a private board-rather than to an administrative
agency-the case illustrates how the Texas Supreme Court adopts
a much more rigorous test than federal courts for evaluating
whether a legislative delegation of power is constitutional.' Other
authorizing an agency to take steps to reduce the state budget violates the separation of
powers doctrine because of "inadequate legislative direction'). But see Fla. Gas Transmission
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 635 So. 2d 941, 944 (Fla. 1994) (holding that a pipeline
certification statute contained sufficient standards and guidelines and thus did not violate the
nondelegation doctrine).
59. 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997).
60. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 74.101-74.127 (Vernon 1995) (amended 1997).
61. See Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 457.
62. See id. at 457-58.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 468.
65. The contrast is obvious when the Boll Weevil case is compared to the Third Circuit's
decision upholding a similar private delegation to increase beef sales in United States v.
Frame, 885 F.3d 1119, 1127-28 (3d Cir. 1989).
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states also rely on the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate legisla-
tive delegations to executive branch agencies."6
Another recent example of state court adjudication of separation
of powers that has implications for regulatory agencies, but which
relies on a theory slightly different than nondelegation, comes from
California. The California Court of Appeals held recently that the
structure of the California Coastal Commission-one of the most
powerful land use authorities in the country-violates the California
separation of powers clause.6" In what Jonathan Zasloff describes as
a "sober and workmanlike" opinion,68 the appellate court relied on
the text of California's constitution. The argument focused on how
California's legislature retains the power to appoint and remove
officials, which encroaches on the "execution" of the law within the
executive branch-a constitutionally prohibited interference with
core executive power. 9
In terms of the results, these cases illustrate how state separation
of powers doctrine constrains the power of state agencies in more
rigid ways than the federal separation of powers doctrine constrains
federal agencies. In reaching these results, state courts purport to
rely overwhelmingly on the texts of state constitutions. As many
commentators have previously concluded, however, the judicial
approach to state separation of powers doctrine is not dictated
exclusively by the texts of individual state constitutions.7 v States
with similar textual language reach very different results, and
states with different constitutional language sometimes reach the
same results.71 Thus, something other then constitutional text must
be driving state courts in the separation of powers context.
66. See Rossi, supra note 6, at 1196-97nn. 141-58 and accompanying text.
67. Marine Forests Soc'y v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 869 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
68. Jonathan Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California's Separation of
Powers, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1079, 1081 (2004).
69. Marine Forests Soc'y, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884-85.
70. See, e.g., Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine
in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 602 (1994) (advising states to judge delegations of
power with reference to a number of factors including legislative standards, procedural
safeguards, and the complexity and sensitivity of the issue); Rossi, supra note 6.
71. Rossi, supra note 6, at 1191-1201.
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B. State Nondelegation Doctrine and State Incorporation of
Federal Regulatory Standards by Reference
State courts are aware of the challenge that the nondelegation
doctrine presents for state constitutional jurisprudence. Decisions
upholding state executive acquiescence to, or adoption of, federal
programs is a context in which state courts have had to look
beyond constitutional text to justify their separation of powers
decisions. Where a state legislature has delegated authority to a
state agency to adopt standards that are based on a federal
standard or to implement a federal goal, the delegation could raise
separation of powers concerns if the state, as Florida and many
others do, embraces a nondelegation doctrine that makes the
assignment of legislative power to the executive branch unconstitu-
tional. Consistent with the growth of cooperative federalism, most
states allow broader legislative delegations where a state legislature
has assigned policymaking authority to a federal, as opposed to a
state, agency.
That state courts uphold such delegations as a matter of state
constitutional law-not as a matter of federal preemption or as a
clear statement rule external to state constitutions-is telling of
how state courts perceive the status of state constitutions in this
context. State courts continue to see state constitutions as independ-
ently relevant legal documents, not something meaningless to state
implementation of federally inspired programs. At the same time,
the explanations state courts give for relaxing the nondelegation
doctrine in this context must stand as a matter of state constitu-
tional law. If the reasons provided by state courts fail to stand as a
matter of separation of powers jurisprudence, it calls into question
whether state constitutionalism can survive the challenges pre-
sented by federal programs and cooperative federalism based on the
reasons state courts give for upholding delegations.
Decrying the general discourse failure of state constitutional law,
James Gardner describes the general corpus of state constitutional
law decisions as "a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and
essentially unintelligible pronouncements." 2 State separation of
72. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REv.
761, 763 (1992).
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powers jurisprudence is a classic illustration of this discourse
failure. Writing over forty-five years ago, Kenneth Culp Davis, then
an authority in the laws governing the growing administrative
state, wrote of state courts considering the nondelegation issue:
"Mhe typical opinion strings together some misleading legal cliches
and announces the conclusion. 73 The four main explanations for
upholding the adoption of federal standards in states-uniformity,
proactivity, extra-territoriality, and political expediency-illustrate
the continuing bankruptcy of state constitutional law discourse in
this context.
1. Uniformity
Appeals to uniformity are commonplace in state decisions
addressing separation of powers challenges to state executive
branch implementation of federal programs. For example, in
McFaddin v. Jackson,74 the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld a
statute that made individual retirement plans taxable if subject to
the federal estate tax but exempt if excluded from the federal
estate tax. Articulating concerns of uniformity and administrative
simplicity in conforming tax statutes, the court reasoned that the
delegation was constitutional, despite the legislature's failure to
provide adequate standards and safeguards.75 In Florida, the
Florida Supreme Court upheld a statute that made unlawful "unfair
7, acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce"7 and
instructed state regulators to adopt regulations consistent with
those of the Federal Trade Commission." The Minnesota Supreme
Court implicitly endorsed uniformity when it approved as constitu-
tional a state law incorporating the federal definition of "eligible
small business" as contained in regulations of the U.S. Small
Business Administration "as amended from time to time."7 A New
Jersey appellate court also cited uniformity as a basis for upholding
73. 1 KENNETH CuLP DAVIS, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.07 (1st ed. 1958).
74. 738 S.W.2d 176 (Tenn. 1987).
75. See id. at 182.
76. Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257, 261 (Fla. 1976).
77. Id. at 267.
78. Minn. Energy & Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Printy, 351 N.W.2d 319, 351-52 (Minn. 1984).
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a similar delegation.79 Another New Jersey appellate court refer-
enced the need for uniformity in upholding media advertising
classification standards for state laws and postal regulations.'
Commentators have also embraced the promotion of uniformity
as an accepted rationale for upholding the acquiescence to, or
adoption of, federal law in the states, notwithstanding state
constitutional principles to the contrary.81 This is perhaps the least
satisfying analytical approach used by state courts for upholding
state agency, or, in other words, acquiescence to adoption of federal
law; yet because it is preeminent, it warrants some evaluation.
Uniformity is an undeniably valuable goal for any federal
program. It advances predictability and certainty for private firms
seeking compliance with the law across jurisdictions. It also reduces
administrative costs for federal agencies attempting to monitor
state compliance with federal standards or goals. For states, too, it
reduces the administrative costs of regulation to the extent that a
state agency can avoid reinventing the wheel on every legal or policy
issue as if it were an issue of first impression.
Appeals to uniformity, however, are somewhat empty normative
concepts for informing the outcome of state separation of powers
jurisprudence in this context. Unlike many rights provisions of
the U.S. Constitution that are incorporated into state constitu-
tions, federal separation of powers principles are not incorporated.
According to the Guarantee Clause, "[t]he United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government .... 2 Although one might argue that this requires some
minimal level of separation of powers in the states,' the clause has
79. State v. Hotel Food Bars, 112 A.2d 726, 732-33 (N.J. 1955).
80. North Jersey Suburbanite Co. v. New Jersey, 381 A.2d 34, 38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1977).
81. For example, one commentator argues that courts addressing the constitutionality of
such delegations should address the importance of uniformity in the area regulated. See
Arnold Rochvarg, State Adoption of Federal Law-Legislative Abdication or Reasoned
Policymaking?, 36 ADMIN. L. REv. 277, 298 (1984).
82. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
83. See, e.g., Fox v. McDonald, 13 So. 416, 420 (Ala. 1893) (noting that the guarantee of
a republican form of government vests the power of selecting governmental officers in the
people, and that the power to appoint to office is not an inherently executive function); see also
Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER
WILLAM"S U. L. REV. 51, 52 (1998) (arguing that "some measure of separation of powers in
state government is ... a structural requirement of the Federal Constitution" and that the
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been held enforceable only by Congress, rather than by the federal
courts.' At best, the U.S. Constitution speaks in a "whisper" to
separation of powers in the states.' Thus, to the extent separation
of powers principles apply at all to the states, they emanate
primarily from state constitutional law, not from the Federal
Constitution.
The very notion of an independent set of state separation of
powers norms eschews uniformity as its primary animating
principle. Further, because Congress has not legislated in the
interests of uniformity-since the states themselves retain legisla-
tive power-in embracing uniformity state courts are replacing
Congress's failure with their own sense of what is in the interests of
interstate commerce. At best, appeals to uniformity might be said
to constitute an effort by a state appellate court to elevate state
legislative intent over the nondelegation doctrine where, in the
court's view, the legislature intended to promote uniformity (and
presumably commerce) between the states. This might be good
policy, and might have a grounding in some implied federal
preemption argument as a matter of federal law, but it has no
plausible basis in an interpretation of state separation of powers.
In the context of some state legislative delegations, particularly
in the cooperative federalism contexts, appeals to uniformity may
actually undermine the goals of federal programs. Cooperative
federalism programs, such as the EPA's effort to establish water
standards and the FCC's effort to implement competition in local
telephony, embrace variation from state to state as a way of
Guarantee Clause is the best textual source for this requirement); Comment, Treatment of the
Separation of Powers Doctrine in Kansas, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 243, 246-56 (1981) (discussing
the Framers' intent regarding the Guarantee Clause and separation of powers doctrine at the
state level).
84. See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 147 (1912) (holding that
Congress's determination of whether a particular state government is "republican" in form
is binding on every other department of government); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1,
42 (1849) (concluding that the determination of whether a particular state government is
"republican" is for Congress, not the courts, to make). But see Dorf, supra note 83, at 67
(arguing that Guarantee Clause claims may be justiciable in state court); Deborah Jones
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 2 (1988) (arguing that the Guarantee Clause could be used to set some
minimum degree of state autonomy from federal regulation).
85. See Dorf, supra note 83, at 77 (concluding that the Constitution forecloses "only those
arrangements deeply offensive to principles of representative government').
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legitimizing federal goals. By suggesting that standards must be
identical from state to state, uniformity may undermine the premise
of cooperative federalism that state political processes are more
likely than their federal counterparts to yield legitimate political
solutions to regulatory programs and are more efficient at achieving
compliance.
2. Proactivity
Another way state courts attempt to preserve delegations to
federal agencies is to distinguish between proactive and retroactive
standards by federal agencies. These courts assume that the state
legislature, in approving an agency's rulemaking or regulatory
powers, implicitly had knowledge of existing federal regulations. At
the same time, since the state legislature could not have known
about future changes to the law, these courts limit the state agency
from adopting future federal agency regulations or interpretations
absent new action by the state legislature.
For example, the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act criminalized the
transportation, storage, processing, disposal and export of "hazard-
ous waste," defined as "solid waste identified or listed as a hazard-
ous waste by the administrator of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency "86 A Texas appellate court upheld this
delegation but only with respect to existing EPA listings."7 The court
noted that this delegation "may be read to say that the legislature
has delegated to the EPA the power to define hazardous waste ...
and that definition may change from time to time at the will of the
EPA" but it also observed that such a construction would "place in
doubt" the constitutionality of the statute under Texas's strict
nondelegation doctrine.88 The court read the statute to incorporate
by reference the EPA's definition of solid waste at the time of
enactment of the Texas statute but not modifications adopted by the
EPA afterwards.8 9 On a similar rationale, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court rejected a legislative delegation to the U.S. Department of
86. TEX. HEALTH& SAFETY CODEANN. § 361.221(a)(1), (2) (repealed 1997) (current version
at § 361.003(12) (Vernon 2004)).
87. Exparte Elliott, 973 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App. 1998).
88. Id. at 741.
89. Id. at 742.
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Labor to set future minimum wage rates in Oklahoma.' Several
other states have followed this approach as well, prohibiting
acquiescence to, or adoption of, future federal standards but
allowing incorporation of past federal law to stand.91
While this distinction-which draws on loose constitutional due
process rhetoric-might seem to promote general fairness, as a
matter of constitutional interpretation it is not at all helpful to state
separation of powers jurisprudence. It relies on a fictional account
of legislative knowledge of specific federal standards at the time of
the passage of state legislation. More importantly, since many state
courts use it as a canon of construction for upholding delegations
(and limiting them), this approach relies on the judiciary to limit
statutes effectively-even clear statutes to the contrary. Even
though many states apply a prohibition on prospective lawmaking
as a canon for upholding delegations, this is more than a disingenu-
ous interpretive technique. This prohibition also freezes the state
regulatory apparatus and may contribute to gaps in regulation,
undermining other (nonconstitutional) goals of regulation, such as
uniformity. For example, if used broadly to sustain state regulatory
programs, this interpretive technique may result in a state having
systematically lower minimum wages or outdated food and drug
standards, in comparison to the federal system or other states.
3. Extra-territoriality
State courts have also found ways to interpret a delegation to a
federal agency as outside the jurisdictional realm of the state
nondelegation doctrine. By characterizing the regulatory action
as a fact of federal, rather than state, lawmaking, states may
avoid having to confront the implications of delegation to a
federal agency. A recent Michigan case took such an approach. The
Michigan legislature had passed a statute limiting the liability of
drug manufacturers for labeling in compliance with Food and Drug
Administration standards. In reviewing a nondelegation challenge
to the statute under Michigan's constitution, the court held that, by
90. Oklahoma City v. Oklahoma, 918 P.2d 26, 30 (Okla. 1995).
91. See, e.g., Indep. Comm. Bankers Ass'n v. State, 346 N.W.2d 737, 744 (S.D. 1984);
People v. Harper, 562 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Colo. 1977); State v. Julson, 202 N.W.2d 145, 150
(N.D. 1972).
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referencing FDA conclusions regarding the safety and efficacy of a
drug, the legislature was merely using factual conclusions of
"independent significance" that in no way constituted a delegation
of legislative authority.92
The characterization of these issues as factual is specious.
Under federal law, it is well recognized that an FDA determination
regarding the safety and efficacy of a drug may be based on factual
findings or inferences, but it is infused with legal and policy
significance.93 Perhaps more interesting is the suggestion that
because these determinations are "independent" and nationwide,
they are somehow extra-territorial--outside of the jurisdiction of a
state court to make a determination that they violate separation of
powers doctrine within the state. This is, of course, based on a false
premise-that federal law has any significance in this context
independent of a state adopting or acquiescing to it. Moreover, as a
jurisdictional or sovereignty argument, this has troubling implica-
tions. It would authorize delegations not only to Congress or federal
agencies but also to private out of state entities as well, such as
national organizations and associations.
4. Separation of Powers as Raw Politics
Upholding state programs that implement federal goals will
frequently advance state interests. Implicit to some state court
opinions is the notion that state separation of powers doctrines
should be relaxed wherever a state stands to benefit politically. For
instance, if a state does not conform its regulations to national
standards, it might face the loss of a business that relies on the
predictability of regulation from state to state in deciding which
markets to serve. In more explicit political confrontations, a state
may face a loss of federal funding if its agencies fail to conform their
regulations to national standards or guidelines. This is a strong
form of the uniformity argument, but it does not embrace uniformity
for the sake of efficiency and predictability. Rather, such uniformity
92. Taylor v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 658 N.W.2d 127, 133 (Mich. 2003).
93. See, e.g., Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 545 (1998) (asserting "that the
determination [of a proposed drug's compliance with safety standards] incorporates
considerable 'policy judgment, ' according to the government).
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stands to benefit a state or interest groups within a state, and thus
is valued for its political consequences.
This is perhaps the most ambitious normative basis for relaxing
separation of powers in the name of federal programs. It seems,
however, to have more horsepower than it needs in order to deal
with the specific problem of delegation of authority to adopt federal
standards. It reduces much state constitutional law, and separation
of powers doctrine in particular, to nothing more than raw politics.
Indeed, many political scientists see formal divisions of governmen-
tal power as rendered irrelevant by the rise of political parties. 4
Perhaps reduction to politics is the best result for which any theory
of allocation of power between the branches of government in states
might hope, but at some level it calls into question whether we
ought to continue to have separation of powers doctrine at all in the
states. Without some principled normative basis, however, courts
should not selectively reduce some separation of powers issue
conflicts to political ones while treating others as legal conflicts.
Although separation of powers principles are often contested, they
play a fundamentally important role in organizing and defining the
powers of state governments and in lending legitimacy to the
internal political processes of states. If state constitutionalism is to
have any hope as an independent interpretive enterprise, it must
either make some effort to articulate the allocation of powers
outside of crude appeals to politics or abandon the nondelegation
doctrine altogether.
III. A SOLUTION FROM WITHIN: SEEDS FOR AN INTERPRETIVE
THEORY OF SEPARATION OF POWERS FOR A SYSTEM OF DUAL
CONSTITUTIONS
The reasons state courts provide for upholding state legislative
delegations to agencies to implement federal programs all assume
that state constitutions are independent. They also all implicitly
treat state constitutions as isolated sources of sovereign power. A
94. THEODORE LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 47-54 (2d ed. 1979): E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER,
THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REAuSS VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 78-96 (1960); see
also Larry D. Kramer. PuttinR the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism.
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215. 219 (2000) (noting that the rise of political parties damaged the
natural and beneficial opposition between state and federal powers).
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more nuanced interpretive approach would not view state constitu-
tions as isolated but as part of a complex institutional scheme in
which shared authority is more commonplace.95 If understood as
responding to specific institutional problems in the design of state
governments, state separation of powers doctrine could provide a
superior interpretive starting point for state courts faced with
nondelegation issues involving federally inspired regulatory
programs. A normative focus on institutional issues would not
relegate state constitutions to the superfluous status of the federal
preemption and clear statement approaches to upholding the
pursuit of federal goals and standards by state agencies.
A. Normative Foundations of the Nondelegation Doctrine
The purposes of separation of powers in general, and the
nondelegation doctrine in particular, are many. The classical liberal,
or libertarian, perspective sees constitutional restrictions on
legislative delegation as applying a rigid separation of functions
between a legislature and other governmental branches in order to
protect individual liberty.' While the classical liberal account is
popular, it has also been criticized for its adherence to formal rules
of separation between the branches of government without regard
to function.97
95. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State
and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 656, 659 (2000) (contrasting the
deference state courts give to other branches of government with the lack of deference the
Supreme Court gives to Congress and the President); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic
Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1415-16 (1999)
(addressing concerns over complex, simultaneous adjudication of federal and state
constitutional claims).
96. This perspective is most commonly associated with Locke and Montesquieu. Locke
regarded the legislative power as supreme but did not believe that it should be arbitrary.
JOHN LOCKE, SEcOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 135-137 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690). Montesquieu justified separation of powers on the grounds that it
protects against the encroachment of individual liberty by government. He wrote that "[w]hen
legislative power is united with executive power in a single person or in a single body of the
magistracy, there is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that
makes tyrannical laws will execute them." MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Anne
M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1752).
97. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987).
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Most contemporary liberal accounts of separation of powers, by
contrast, focus on the non-rights based functions of nondelegation,
such as enhancing accountability. Some functionalist accounts
emphasize how nondelegation protects legislative accountability by
ensuring a tight connection to majoritarian electoral processes,98
while other accountability advocates see more complicated links to
electoral values,9" or endorse a welfare-based definition of account-
ability."° Still others see separation of powers as primarily con-
cerned with promoting efficient government.'01 Certainly, where one
places the functional emphasis influences how strongly one views
the role of constitutional restrictions on legislative delegations, but
the nondelegation doctrine has been defended on both libertarian
and functionalist grounds.
One recent functionalist account of the nondelegation doctrine
creatively and usefully blends the incomplete contracts and interest
group accounts of lawmaking to argue that the nondelegation
doctrine enhances welfare by preserving majoritarian checks on
lawmaking. Scott Baker and Kimberly Krawiec argue that legisla-
tion can be understood as a type of incomplete contract between
legislators and interest groups that participate in the lawmaking
process. °2 In their view, the nondelegation doctrine serves as a type
of "penalty" default rule, by which courts declare unconstitutional
statutes that are passed by a legislature in order to shift or avoid
98. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 99-107 (1993); David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy:
A Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731, 732 (1999).
99. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 81-82 (1985) (arguing that agency delegation should be
done with reference to specific legislative mandates in order to prevent "broad policy choice
by administrative officials").
100. This is the view that legislative delegations "conceal] political transfers from the
public, making it more difficult for the public to interefere with [them]," at some cost to social
welfare. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1721, 1746 (2002).
101. DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST
APPROACH TO DELEGATION UNDER SEPARATION OF POWERS (1999); JESSICA KORN, THE POWER
OF SEPARATION: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE MYTH OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 14-
26 (1996); JOHN A. ROHR, To RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE 15 (1986).
102. Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 663, 664-65 (2004) (considering incompleteness to be a result of public choice theory).
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responsibility.103 By requiring majoritarian processes-a legislative
vote, for example-to more fully constrain an executive decision
maker, such a penalty has the effect of limiting the manipulation of
the legislative process by powerful interest groups seeking to
maximize their ability to capture, or control, the executive branch
at the cost of majoritarian processes.
Understanding nondelegation as a type of penalty default rule
for interest groups in the political process assumes that lawmak-
ing responsibility is clearly within the constitutional ambit of a
single branch of government-the legislature. Separation of powers
principles delimit the respective spheres of authority for legislative
and executive branches of government, but the incomplete contracts
argument for a nondelegation doctrine should not be taken too far.
In addition to looking at legislation as a type of incomplete contract,
as do Baker and Krawiec, economists have suggested that constitu-
tions may also be understood as a type of incomplete contract in
which elected officials are offered incentive-laden schemes with
payoffs but all future states of affairs are not specified." On this
account of constitutions, separation of powers can be understood as
a set of default rules designed to fill the gaps of an incomplete
contract that exists between the legislature and the executive. A
rigid separation of powers that splits decision making between the
branches, as is present in many states, might promote accountabil-
ity by ensuring clarity of authority for both the legislative and
executive branches, which increases the majoritarian accountability
behind fundamental policy choices by the legislative branch.
At the same time, rigid separation of authority to protect a tight
relationship with majoritarian elections through the institution of
the legislative branch is not always sufficient to protect accountabil-
ity. If branches of government with opposing interests are allowed
to make independent claims on public resources without any joint
decision making, common pool problems might lead to decreases in
accountability. The budgeting process is a good example of such an
occurrence. Suppose that one decision-making body-the execu-
tive-has complete control over the size of the budget, while another
103. Id. at 665.
104. Torsten Persson et al., Separation of Powers and Political Accountability, 112 Q.J.
ECON. 1163, 1165 (1997).
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body-the legislature-has control over its composition. In a perfect
world, voters would know which branch is accountable for which
decision, but informational asymmetries between legislators and
voters (or between the executive and voters) can lead to informa-
tional rents that have disastrous consequences for voters."5
Similarly, once a legislature has made a delegation decision,
authority is frequently shared between the executive branch,
charged with enforcing and implementing the law, and the legisla-
tive branch, which retains authority over budget and control over
statutory criteria. Features such as checks and balances can be
understood as a way to elicit information from voters in democratic
processes where there is a conflict between the branches. 06
Thus, while a bargaining framework may provide some support
for a nondelegation doctrine, it must also consider the role of checks
and balances in a political system. Overlaps in authority between
the executive and legislative branches can provide such checks and
balances by promoting a type of competition that can elicit informa-
tion from voters to keep executive and legislative officials more
accountable. For example, even lawmaking power delegated to the
executive branch may be subject to majoritarian processes in
national presidential elections. I0 7 This may be one reason that
federal courts refuse to accept the strong nondelegation doctrine
that some commentators urge as a penalty default.'08
B. Extending a Normative Account of Nondelegation to the States
In many state constitutional systems, however, the checks and
balances counterargument against a nondelegation doctrine is
weaker due to unique institutional features of state governments.
For example, to the extent that an executive branch is unilateral,
the political process can more systematically elicit information from
voters to dissipate informational rents that result from delegation.
If, however, an executive branch is not unilateral, the political
process may not naturally provide clear checks and balances. If
105. Id. at 1166.
106. Id.
107. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 152-56 (1997).
108. See Baker & Krawiec, supra note 102.
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legislators are term-limited, or legislatures meet infrequently,
interest groups may be able to take advantage of informational
asymmetries, persuading agencies to adopt policies with little or no
scrutiny by voters. An analysis of the benefits of separation of
powers doctrines, such as the nondelegation doctrine, in the states
must begin by focusing on institutional features that distinguish the
design of state governments from the federal government.
The designs of political institutions in many state constitutions
differ fundamentally from their design within the Federal Constitu-
tion. Key institutional differences between the federal and most
state legislative systems suggest that at the state level, more
information about executive agency regulation is likely to be hidden
from voters. One difference is that state legislatures are in session
for shorter periods than the U.S. Congress, and thus, state legisla-
tive assemblies are less likely to have familiarity with issues and
time to evaluate bills than members of Congress. For example, the
Texas legislature sits for 120-day sessions once every two years.' 9
Florida has a sixty-day session; only about forty-five are working
days. New Mexico's sessions are only sixty calendar days in odd-
numbered years, while in even-numbered years, sessions are limited
to only thirty days and the focus is mainly on fiscal matters.110 Many
other state legislatures have similarly short sessions."' Term limits,
widely endorsed in states, exacerbate the effect of the information
asymmetry between legislative and agency decision makers. A
short legislative session might make delegation to an executive
branch more practical, but most state courts have not endorsed
delegation for this efficiency purpose. Instead, state courts ad-
hering to a strong nondelegation doctrine sacrifice the potential
efficiencies associated with delegation to ensure that the legislature,
rather than an agency, makes key policy decisions. This safeguards
against lessening the accountability provided through legislative
elections.
109. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 5; see also Bruff, supra note 6, at 1346 (discussing the
potential impact of this institutional feature on Texas nondelegation doctrine).
110. See ALAN ROSENTHAL, THE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: PROCESS,
PARTICIPATION, AND POWER IN STATE LEGISLATURES 128 (1998).
111. See 32 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 64-67 (1998-
99); see also Alan Rosenthal, The State of State Legislatures: An Overview, 11 HOFSTRAL. REV.
1185, 1187-1204 (1983) (noting that, historically, less time was spent in session by state
legislatures but that the trend since the 1960s has been toward more in-session time).
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Other institutional design features also illustrate why such a
safeguard on legislative accountability may be necessary in the
states. Although in many states legislative staff is extensive, most
states provide members of the legislature minimal staff assis-
tance in exercising their lawmaking function. 2 Also, because of
geographic proximity and economic and cultural similarities, the
organization and mobilization of interest groups, such as farming
or tobacco interest groups, is much easier at the state than the
national level. Given lower costs of organization and mobilization,
such interest groups are more likely to influence the political
process at the state level than at the federal level."' Aware of this
phenomenon at the time of the nation's founding, Madison wrote:
' The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagra-
tion through the other States ... .. " Madison derided the tendency
of state legislators to sacrifice the interests of their state for the
particular and separate views of their counties and localities."'
Factions increase the likelihood of capture of the state legislative
process-particularly delegation to an agency controlled by a small
but powerful constituency. Modern state legislatures undergo a high
degree of turnover vis-a-vis the U.S. Congress," 6 contributing to the
likelihood that the state legislative process will produce laws that
are the product of highly organized special interest groups repre-
senting a small but vocal group of the legislature's constituency.
At the federal level, delegation of decision-making authority to
agency decision makers can have pro-democratic effects, in part
because the unitary executive provides some degree of streamlined
112. See ALAN ROSENTHAL, LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE IN THE STATES: EXPLORATIONS OF
COMMITrEE BEHAVIOR 149-51 (1974).
113. For over thirty years, economists and political scientists have recognized and explored
the role of interest groups in influencing the political process and its outcomes. See, e.g.,
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION (1975); George J.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971). The
insights of economists such as Stigler have been applied by modern political scientists writing
in the field of public choice. See MASAW, supra note 107; Jim Rossi, Public Choice Theory and
the Fragmented Web of the Contemporary Administrative State, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1746, 1747
(1998) (book review).
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 173 (James Madison) (David Wootton ed., 2003).
115. See JOSEPH M. BEssErrE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON 26 (1994).
116. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 112, at 67-80 (describing the influence of term limits and
other factors on the degree of professionalism in state legislatures).
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accountability to the President for agency policy decisions.1 17 Even
though the President is not aware of most agency decisions, the
President often is held accountable by the media, Congress, and the
public at large for the positions of agencies within his branch. Many
suggest that the U.S. Constitution envisions such a unitary
executive."'8
Although a few states follow this approach,1 9 most states do not
embrace a unitary executive.12 ° In Texas, for instance, the long
ballot provides for the separate election of officials such as the
Lieutenant Governor, the Attorney General, the Comptroller, the
Treasurer, and the Land Commissioner.'2 1 Florida also has a plural
executive branch, providing for separate and independent election
of a Governor, an Attorney General, a Chief Financial Officer, and
117. See MASHAW, supra note 107.
118. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1158-59 (1992) (discussing the
implications of various Article III constructions on readings of Article II and concluding that
broad, legislative jurisdiction-stripping power necessarily implies a unitary executive reading
of Article II); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers
and the President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 991-92 (1993) (noting that the
Framers believed that the President should be the exclusive party held accountable for the
administration of federal law).
119. The Pennsylvania and Virginia executives are almost entirely unitary, providing for
general election of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, and a few other
officers. See PA. CONST. art. 4, §§ 1, 4.1, 5, 18 (providing for the election of a Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Auditor General, and State Treasurer); VA. CONST.
art. 5, §§ 2, 13, 15 (providing for the election of a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and
Attorney General). Some of the more recent state constitutions also provide for a unitary
executive. See ALASKA CONST. art. III, §§ 3, 8 (noting the only elected officials are the
Governor and Lieutenant Governor, who run together on a single ticket); HAW. CONST. art.
V, § 6 (providing that heads of all principal departments will be nominated by the Governor
and confirmed by the Senate); IOWA CONST. art. IV, §§ 2, 17-4.22 (including provisions similar
to those in Alaska, but also providing for election of a Secretary of State, Auditor, and
Treasurer); MD. CONST. art. II, § 10 (including provisions similar to those in Hawaii); N.J.
CONST. art. V, § 4, 2, 3 (same).
120. All but four states provide for independent election of lower (or co-equal) executive
branch officials, and many provide for popular election of executive offices. See 32 THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 38-40 (1998-99). The plural
executive branch is largely a result of turn-of-the-century progressive constitutional reform.
See Rogan Kersh et al., "More a Distinction of Words than Things". The Evolution of Separated
Powers in the American States, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 5, 29-35 (1998).
121. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2 (providing that the Attorney General, Comptroller of
Public Accounts, and Commissioner of General Land Office be elected statewide along with
the Governor and Lieutenant Governor and that the Secretary of State be appointed by the
Governor); see also Bruff, supra note 6, at 1347.
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a Commissioner of Agriculture.'22 Alabama provides for separate
statewide election of a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney
General, State Auditor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer,
Superintendent of Education, and Commissioner of Agriculture and
Industries.'23 Most other states have similar provisions providing for
independent election of statewide executives, although the listing of
executives varies from state to state,'24 and a handful of states
with older constitutions provide for election of some executive
officers by the legislature.'25 Among states that deviate from the
unitary executive model in their constitutions, the governor's power
to lead and supervise bureaucracy is reduced,'26 although political
scientists observe great variations in the degree of reduced leader-
ship and supervision. 7 Regardless of the variations of degree
across the states, in most states the ability of a governor to oversee
122. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4, 5; see also Richard Scher, The Governor and the Cabinet:
Executive Policy-Making and Policy-Management, in THE FLORIDA PUBLIC POLICY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: GROWTH AND REFORM IN AMERICA'S FOURTH LARGEST STATE 73
(Richard Chackerian ed., 2d ed. 1998).
123. See ALA. CONST. art. V, §§ 112, 114-116.
124. See ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 3; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 11;
COLO. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 3; CONN. CONST. art. 4, §§ 1, 3, 4; DEL. CONST. art. 3, §§ 10, 19, 21;
GA. CONST. art. V, § III, 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 1; IND. CONST. art.
6, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 1; KY. CONST. § 91; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. V,
§ 21; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. 5, §§ 133-134; MO. CONST. art. IV, § 17; NEB.
CONST. art. IV, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 5, § 19; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 1;
N.D. CONST. art. V, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. III, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art VI, § 4; OR. CONST. art.
VI, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. IV, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. VI, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 7; UTAH CONST.
art. VII, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. II, §§ 43, 47-49; WASH. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 3; W. VA. CONST. art.
VII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. VI, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 11.
125. See ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 2, § 1; pt. 3, § 1 (providing for legislative election of the
Secretary of State and Treasurer); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 4, art. I (providing for
legislative election of the Secretary, Treasurer and Receiver General, Commissary General,
Notaries Public, and Naval Officers); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 67 (providing for legislative
election of the Secretary of State and Treasurer); TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (providing for
legislative election of the Treasurer or Treasurers, and Comptroller of the Treasury).
126. An example is Florida. Richard Scher observes that, although Florida's governor is
historically weak in power relative to other state governors, reforms to budgetary power have
strengthened the power of Florida's governor since 1968. See Scher, supra note 122, at 79.
127. See Thad L. Beyle, Governors, in POLITICSINTHEAMERICAN STATES 301 (Virginia Gray
et al. eds., 1990); Joseph A. Schlesinger, The Politics of the Executive, in POLITICS IN THE
AMERICAN STATES 207 (Herbert Jacob & Kenneth N. Vines eds., 1971); Julia E. Robinson, The
Role of the Independent Political Executive in State Governance: Stability in the Face of
Change, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 119, 120 (1998) (demonstrating the different roles of state
executives as compared with federal executives and arguing this difference has the effects of
responsiveness and innovation in the states).
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executive policymaking is weak relative to that of the President.
From an accountability perspective, this makes delegation more
suspicious in the states than at the federal level.
Because of institutional design differences between the federal
system and that of many states, and because of the way these
differences reduce majoritarian checks on delegations, state courts
have stronger accountability-based reasons for endorsing the
nondelegation doctrine than their federal counterparts. 128 In the
states, delegation is more likely to result in informational asymme-
tries, hiding policy choices from voters and majoritarian processes.
State legislatures, and often agencies, are more prone to faction
than the U.S. Congress or federal agencies. As has been recognized
since James Madison penned Federalist No. 10, the costs of
organizing and mobilizing local factions are lower at the state level
than in national politics. Moreover, state legislatures, in session for
very limited terms, are not as effective as Congress at providing
political oversight for agencies' policy decisions. In addition, at the
state level, agencies are less accountable to an executive leader than
are federal agencies, and judicial review of agency decision making
is much less rigorous at the state than at the federal level.
Combined, these factors allow state political processes to send a
less complete set of informational signals to voters than may occur
at the federal level. The nondelegation doctrine may help to clarify
these signals. At the state level, the nondelegation doctrine may
play a more important role in minimizing the ability of interest
groups to convince a legislature to delegate primary policy decisions
to the executive branch. The nondelegation doctrine serves to focus
these interest groups-and voter attention more generally--on the
legislature. Delegation is a terrific strategy for any private interest
group that is not successful in obtaining what it wants from the
legislature.
Even if an interest group can obtain what it wants from the state
legislature, because of lower transparency and greater future
control, it might prefer an agency solution to a legislative solution.
Because states feature less direct electoral accountability in the
128. Joshua Sarnoff, by contrast, suggests that we invalidate cooperative federalism
programs as a matter of federal nondelegation doctrine. Sarnoff, supra note 8, at 210-11. It
strikes me as overkill, though, to invalidate a federal program that provides more safeguards,
under state procedures, than most federal agency programs.
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executive branch, interest groups may be able to extract informa-
tional rents from the executive that are not available from the
legislature. Separation of powers and the nondelegation doctrine
might thus be understood as responding to this particular gover-
nance failure in state democracies. By contrast, in the federal
system, where national presidential elections serve to promote
executive accountability and where interest groups that are
successful in states lack power or cancel each other out in the
federal lawmaking process, the need for a nondelegation doctrine is
less salient.'29
When compared to competing explanations provided in the
written judicial opinions of state courts, this account provides a
superior method for understanding the outcome of constitutional
challenges to state delegations in the context of federally inspired
regulatory programs-including the adoption of federal standards
and cooperative federalism goals. Separation of powers in the states
serves to enhance the accountability of the legislative process by
eliciting information about important policies from voters and
minimizing the opportunities for rent-seeking by interest groups.
The information that can be gained from voters in the states by
invalidating delegations is more likely to be useful to the state
legislative process than it is to Congress. Further, the costs of
organizing and mobilizing interest groups are lower at the state as
opposed to the federal level. While a powerful interest group with
parochial interests may be successful in influencing policy at the
local or state level, in national politics that same interest group may
have little or no power, or its influence may be diffuse.13 ° Thus,
there is little need for a nondelegation doctrine even to be applied
to a state legislature's delegation to a federal agency. In such a
context, there is a clearer majoritarian check on the federal
executive than would have generally existed had the state execu-
tive adopted the same standard. Because interest groups are
129. In a similar vein, Edward Swaine recently has argued that Congress's delegations to
international bodies, such as the WTO and the U.N., are constitutional to the extent that they
provide a bulwark against concentration of political power that is consistent with the
ambitions of federalism. Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International
Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1492 (2004).
130. For a defense of Dillon's rule as a limit on the power of local government based on
similar concerns, see Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959 (1994).
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more diffuse and thus far less likely to play a major role in federal
regulatory processes, there is nothing to be gained by a non-
delegation doctrine limiting interest group domination of legislative
bargaining at the state level. Put simply, state separation of powers
in such contexts has little or no purpose, and its application should
be suspended to the extent it poses any conflict.
The relaxation of the nondelegation doctrine in the context of
state acquiescence to, or adoption of, federal programs can thus be
understood within state separation of powers itself-not by making
some broad policy appeal to uniformity, by creating a legislative
fiction, by redefining law or policy as fact, or by turning separation
of powers into nothing more than a political bargaining chip. Such
an analysis would suggest that state legislatures may delegate to
state agencies the power to adopt ready-made federal standards
without regard to retroactivity concerns. To be sure, states might
make such delegations for a variety of different policy reasons,
including some that might not be geared towards national unifor-
mity or administrative efficiency. Some interest groups may even
be organized around federal programs from which they benefit, and
they would be encouraged to lobby state legislators for their
adoption. A state political process-not a nondelegation doctrine-
would be the most effective way to guard against interest group
politics in such delegations. Adding an executive branch role into
their implementation would enhance, rather than reduce, the
chances of publicly transparent reasons for adopting the federal
standards.
Cooperative federalism programs often involve a fundamentally
different kind of delegation-from Congress to a state agency-but
also frequently depend on affirmative state legislative support.
Recalcitrant state legislatures can serve as barriers to the imple-
mentation of such programs, and a similar set of state non-
delegation concerns exacerbates their influence. The institutional
design account of state separation of powers suggests that state
courts can find a normative constitutional solution for cooperative
federalism programs from within a state rather than ceding to
federal courts the preemption or political process override of a
state's constitution.
This approach shares the political account of the raw politics
assessment of separation of powers without sacrificing all legal
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constraints on government power. 131 Rather, it gives courts a more
principled basis for recognizing when the raw politics assessment of
separation of powers doctrine might have some useful role to play
in the states. While an institutional design account is deferential
to national politics, and thus consistent with efforts to introduce
humility and deference into public law,132 it also recognizes that
state constitutions do not always require deference to legislatures
on issues of delegation, and it gives them some principled basis for
understanding when deference is appropriate. Politics has a place
in state and national processes, but the institutional design account
also allows state constitutions some modest role in constraining it
and provides a baseline for delimiting when politics might eclipse
legal constraints. In states that do not endorse the nondelegation
doctrine as a matter of state constitutional interpretive practice, it
would seem that the political process has completely supplanted any
legal restriction on legislative delegation of authority to adopt
federal standards or to implement cooperative federalism programs.
An institutional design account of state separation of powers is
very much in line with what other commentators have urged in
this unique constitutional interpretation context. G. Alan Tarr, for
instance, has argued that, given the unique features of state
constitutional structure, states require a "distinctive" separation of
powers jurisprudence. 33 Dan Rodriguez has argued for a "trans-
state" constitutionalism.'34 In echoing these efforts, I do not intend
to argue that a one-size-fits-all approach to legal doctrine on all
nondelegation constitutional questions is appropriate. Rather, the
challenge for "trans-state" separation of powers is to identify what
makes it distinctive from the federal system in normative ways that
might be generalizable across some, if not all, states. Political
science provides a fertile starting place for any such interpretive
theory; specifically, a study of the power and effects of interest
groups in state political processes provides the seed for a theory of
131. See supra Part II.B.4.
132. See Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue
Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1574-75 (1988).
133. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 7-8 (1998). As Tarr notes,
"[s]tate governments are not restricted in the purposes for which they can exercise
power-they can legislate comprehensively to protect the public welfare ...." Id. at 7. For a
classic description of this feature of state governments, see W.F. Dodd, The Function of a State
Constitution, 30 POL. SCI. Q. 201, 205 (1915).
134. Rodriguez, supra note 43, at 290-91.
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state separation of powers that is both distinctive from federal
political processes and generalizable across states. Such an account
requires careful study of how interest group participation in state
politics, and in the unique institutional settings of state govern-
ment, might call for a different allocation of powers than other
institutional settings, such as our federal system of government.
Although this Article applies this insight to separation of powers
between state legislative and executive branches, such a project may
even have implications for other structural doctrines of state
constitutional law that balance or mediate participation in state and
federal political processes, such as the political question doctrine
and questions concerning standing.
CONCLUSION
Echoing prominent appellate lawyer John Frank, who describes
state constitutional law as "a sort of pallid me-tooism,"'1 5 Dan
Rodriguez suggests that state constitutional law, in its present form,
is but a minor part of our national "constitutional order."'36 Appeals
to federal preemption and clear statement rules in federal courts as
ways of overcoming the obstacles posed by state constitutions in a
dual constitutional lawmaking structure threaten to reduce its role
even further.
Yet federal programs need not render moot the legal status of
state constitutions. As many state courts recognize, state constitu-
tions continue to play an important role in organizing political
processes in the adoption of federal standards. Their role is equally,
if not more, important where state agencies are implementing
federal programs of a cooperative federalism nature. Richard
Briffault has suggested that a more sophisticated federalism would
not see all decentralized power as homogenous, but would recognize
distinctive features of state and local power, which are often in
conflict.'37 Particularly where states implement federal goals or
simply borrow federal standards, a more sophisticated account of
state power would recognize that state legislatures and executive
officers also have distinctive features and frequently conflict over
135. See John P. Frank, Book Reviews, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1985).
136. Rodriguez, supra note 43, at 272.
137. See Briffault, supra note 40, at 1305.
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implementation issues. For state constitutions to retain their
relevance against the backdrop of such conflicts, a more nuanced
interpretive account is needed. The challenge is for state courts to
develop an interpretive strategy for preserving their own state-
specific constitutional values while also recognizing the larger
objectives of federal regulatory programs and goals. For state
systems, an institutional account of separation of powers holds
greater promise than its competitors as an interpretive strategy for
state courts as they struggle with this task.
